ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12

NEW YORK TIMES
31 March 1987

Departing U.S. Envoy Criticizes Use Of Young Marine Guards in Moscow

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 30 — Arthur A. Hartman, the departing Ambassador to the Soviet Union, said today that he believed the young, single Marine guards at the embassy in Moscow should be replaced by a more mature force less susceptible to temptation.

His comments came as the State Department and the Marine Corps announced that all 28 marines at the embassy were being recalled.

The State Department said that the move was "precautionary" and that none of the marines now in Moscow had been implicated in the espionage cases against Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy.

Mr. Hartman, who was Ambassador from 1981 until this month, said in an interview that he had no idea about the latest cases of Marine fraternization with Soviet women.

Receptionist for Hartman

One of the women worked for a time as a receptionist in Spaso House, the Ambassador's residence, and met with one of the Marine guards charged with espionage at two embassy social functions — a dance and a Marine party.

Ambassador Hartman said that these were clear violations of regulations against social contacts and that "if I had known, that would have been grounds to send them out of town immediately."

A State Department spokesman, speaking of the recall of the present Marine guards, said the move would aid the various investigations of the possible security breach. They will be replaced with guards from other Marine posts and from the training command in Quantico, Va.

Embassy Accused on Security

As measures were taken to deal with the spying case, Administration and Congressional officials said the embassy in Moscow had been slow to respond to warnings that it was vulnerable. One official today described it as "porous."

Ambassador Hartman said the embassy had been vigilant about security.

"But something bad has happened here and we have got to find out what happened," he said.

He said he had raised questions about some security recommendations because of their effect on the functioning of the embassy.

Mr. Hartman said the embassy had previously had problems with Marine guards' being involved in black market currency dealings and rowdy parties. Several had been ordered to leave the Soviet Union for fraternizing with Soviet women.

"We have had problems with the Marine guards for some time, though not of this nature," he said. "I have been saying we ought to look for alternatives. They are not suited to Moscow because they are young and single."

Several officials disputed Mr. Hartman's characterization of the embassy's attitude toward security. One said the problems had been identified in several reports, including a 1985 study by a State Department advisory commission that attributed significant intelligence breaches to the employment of Soviet nationals at the embassy.

> The present crew in Moscow is being is recalled as a precaution.

The report prompted Secretary of State George P. Shultz to approve a plan to replace the Soviet employees, but before the plan could be carried out, the Soviet Government last October ordered all Soviet workers to leave employment in the United States Embassy.

These officials said they were shocked to learn that despite all the reports on security, the Marine guards in Moscow last year were violating one of the most basic regulations: a ban on social contacts with Soviet citizens.

One of the Marine guards accused of spying, Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree, told investigators that Violetta Seina, the woman with whom he had an affair and who introduced him to Soviet agents, had attended at a Marine ball. In another instance, Sergeant Lonetree said, a Marine guard invited several Soviet employees of the embassy to a Marine party.

A Congressional aide who has studied security problems at the Moscow embassy said: "That is absurd. There is an absolute rule against fraternization."

Two other Congressional aides said the State Department had been "unenthusiastic" in its response to studies of security problems at the embassy. They said that diplomats had told Congressional investigators that they assumed the Soviet Union eavesdropped routinely on them.

"There is a pervasive environment there," one aide said.

The 1985 report, by the State Department's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, called for the creation of "boards of inquiry" that would investigate security breaches. The recommendation was never followed, officials said.

A June 1986 report by the Congressional watchdog agency, the General Accounting Office, said that the State Department's efforts to secure embassies against terrorism had resulted in some improvements, but that there were still shortcomings.

A State Department spokeswoman, Phyllis Oakley, said today that security arrangements in Moscow were now being reviewed.

Embassy Penetrated in the Past

The embassy in Moscow has been repeatedly penetrated by Soviet intelligence. According to officials, the 1985 advisory commission, headed by Adm. Bobby R. Inman, found that the embassy's cars carried electronic listening devices planted by Soviet agents. In a more serious breach, embassy typewriters were subjected to surveillance.

"For years, the Soviets were reading some of our most sensitive diplomatic correspondence, economic and political analyses, and other communications," said a 1986 report on counterintelligence by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. One of the typewriters involved, an official said, was used by the secretary to the deputy chief of mission in Moscow.

Members of Congress, including Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, have said that the State Department last year tried to block legislation that forced reductions in the number of Soviet nationals employed.

Leahy-Cohen Bill Recalled

One intelligence official said the matter had been the subject of a debate between security agencies, which said the Soviet nationals were a threat, and the State Department, which argued they were not.

A bill to cut the numbers of Soviet diplomats in the United States and the number of Soviet nationals employed in Moscow was introduced last year by Senators Leahy and William Cohen, the Maine Republican who is now vice chairman of the intelligence committee.

The bill was endorsed by President Reagan in a radio address in June 1986 and passed the Congress shortly afterward. But in July, when the law reached a House-Senate conference committee, the State Department sent a letter once again registering opposition. To defeat this tactic, Senator Leahy circulated copies of Mr. Reagan's radio address to members of the conference committee.

Later in 1986, after the Administration expelled 25 Soviet diplomats, Moscow responded by removing all Soviet employees from the American Embassy.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
31 March 1987

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 36

The Intelligence Mystique

By Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

The mystique of the secret intelligence services has long held the world in thrall. Ever since William Le Queux and E. Phillips Oppenheim wrote their tales about British secret agents saving the Empire from the Kaiser before World War I, we have all rejoiced in the melodrama of spy and counterspy. Le Queux's fantasies actually led on to the establishment in 1909 of the modern British services. Two world wars nourished the mystique, and the Cold War has given intelligence agencies in every major country unprecedented status, money and power.

It is easy to understand the mystique's appeal. There is something inherently fascinating about stories of daring, intrigue, deception, clandestineness and unsung heroism. From the gritty realism of John Le Carre to the glamorous romanticism of Ian Fleming, the spy story has diverted our minds and, it cannot be denied, addled our brains. For fascination with the mystique becomes dangerous when governments succumb to the belief—sedulously encouraged by all intelligence agencies—that covert methods provide a cheap way to foreign-policy successes.

Nations that fear their world power is slipping away place, in Mr. Le Carre's words, "ever greater trust in the magic formulae and hocus-pocus of the spy world. When the king is dying, the charlatans dash in."

More Trouble Than They're Worth?

Now intelligence agencies obviously have their necessary role amid the anarchy of states. No power in our jungle world can afford to do without them. But the mystique magnifies their importance, endows them with superhuman skills and considerably exaggerates the difference they make. As the delusion spreads that the clandestine services alone understand the true requirements of national security, as their budgets grow, as their dark deeds multiply, as their influence swells in the councils of state, one may begin to wonder whether the troubles they cause are not greater than the benefits they bring.

Such thoughts must be much on the minds of people in Israel these days. For years the world has been told how marvelous, accurate and efficient the Israeli intelligence service is. But the Pollard affair finishes that myth. Nor is this an isolated incident. The British government recently discovered that Mossad, the Israeli service, has been forging British passports for use by Israeli hit men. Mossad further enraged the British by kidnapping the Israeli technician who gave the Sunday Times information about Israel's nuclear-weapons program.

These are only a few of the scandals that led Time magazine to conclude that "Israel's vaunted state-security apparatus seems to have gone amuck." The consequence of a free rein given to Israeli secret agents has been, in the name of national security, to increase Israel's international insecurity.

Britain, meantime, has been having troubles with its own intelligence agencies. Mrs. Thatcher's misbegotten effort to prevent the publication in Australia of a book by Peter Wright, a former MI-5 officer, has brought attention to Mr. Wright's admission that in the 1970s an MI-5 group was engaged in a campaign to undermine Harold Wilson's Labor government. When Mr. Wilson himself claimed some years ago that MI-5 operatives had been doing this, people talked sadly about poor Harold's paranoia.

There can be no doubt now that he was right. The MI-5 gang got it into its head that the prime minister might be a Soviet mole and launched a campaign to drive him out of Downing Street. We "bugged and burgled our way round London," Mr. Wright now says. In addition, MI-5 forged documents designed to discredit cabinet ministers.

Mrs. Thatcher thus far has blocked parliamentary efforts to establish the details of this MI-5 effort to destabilize a British government. "If it was the United States," Merlyn Rees, a former home secretary, told the House of Commons on March 16, "there would be a proper investigation. There would be hell to pay."

Indeed, there would. If a CIA group had been exposed as trying to smear and overthrow an American administration, one can imagine the outcry in Congress. There are advantages to the separation of powers.

The U.S. hardly has been exempt from embarrassments caused by secret operatives. The Reagan administration has shown touching faith in the wondrous efficacy of clandestine methods. And yet, with all the vast resources of the CIA and the FBI at his command, our president tells us that his administration simply cannot find out what his cowboys were up to nor in whose pockets the money generated by the secret arms sales to Iran has ended up.

The answer to such questions, Mr. Reagan keeps plaintively saying, must await investigations conducted by congressional committees and the special prosecutor. If the CIA and FBI cannot even find out what officials of the American government have been doing, what are we paying them for? And why should we take seriously what they tell us about the Russians?

One can continue down the list. The French secret service sank the blameless Rainbow Warrior, the Greenpeace anti-nuclear protest ship, and thereby embroiled France in international troubles far greater than any harm the Rainbow Warrior could conceivably have done. From all accounts, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is having his own problems with the KGB.

Intelligence agencies, sealed off by walls of secrecy from the pull and haul of normal life, form closed and claustrophobic worlds. Prolonged immersion in this ultimately hallucinatory world erodes the reality principle. Intelligence operatives begin to see themselves as the appointed guardians of the nation, more devoted and more knowledgeable than transient elected officials, morally authorized to do on their own whatever they believe the nation's security demands. Intelligence services generate fantasy, protect fantasy and indulge merchants of fantasy like Lt. Col. North. And rival intelligence agencies live off each other: The KGB needs the CIA, the CIA needs the KGB and both expend much of their effort in private jousts with the other (like the recent affair of Nicholas Daniloff) instead of concentrating on the collection and analysis of intelligence.

The sad fact remains that we must have intelligence agencies. The problem is how to bring them under control. The first point in a rational program would be to increase external oversight. The English journalist Chapman Pincher, who has written several books exposing real and alleged Soviet penetration of the British services, used to oppose oversight. He has latterly changed his mind and now regards oversight as the "only deterrent" to the misleading of Parliament and the public by official statements "distorted, manipulated and, on occasion, falsified on spurious grounds of 'national interest,' while the real purpose was to prevent embarrassment of departments and individuals."

He adds that a "degree of oversight far more embracing than anything likely to be accepted in Britain has been operating successfully and safely in the United States." Recent developments, however, show that our present oversight system is far from adequate. The Reagan administration has

Board of Contributors

Operatives begin to see themselves as the guardians of the nation, more knowledgeable than elected officials.

Continued

flagrantly overridden not only the principles on which legislative oversight is based but also laws enacted by Congress. It has done so with impunity. The laws lack criminal penalties. Effective oversight calls for addition of severe penalties to laws controlling covert action. It also calls for legislation requiring that all presidential intelligence "findings" be put in writing and sent within 48 hours to the National Security Council and to the congressional intelligence committees—again with penalties in case of violation.

Mr. Le Carre warns that oversight is not enough. External scrutiny of intelligence service, he writes, "is largely an illusory concept. If they're good, they fool the outsiders—and if they're bad they fool themselves." The other part of the reform program must be drastic cuts in the CIA budget. For many years the CIA has spent most of its money on covert action. Such action is an infallible means of getting the country into unnecessary trouble. The more numerous the covert action operatives, the more widespread the trouble.

'Not Worth the Risk'

In 1956, Robert A. Lovett and David Bruce wrote a report for the president's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities condemning "the increased mingling in the internal affairs of other nations of bright, highly graded young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their reason for being." In January 1961 the same board told President Eisenhower, "We have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert actions programs undertaken by the CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved." Covert action, the report continued, had "tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence-gathering mission." Nothing the CIA has done in 25 years since gives reason to alter this verdict.

William Webster would be well advised to accept a large cut in the CIA budget, to order the intelligence community to concentrate on its prime and indispensable function—collection and analysis of intelligence—and to reduce covert action to a standby capability. He also should read two excellent new books: Christopher Andrew's scholarly but lively study "Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community," and the usefully skeptical work by Philip Knightley, "The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the 20th Century."

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer professor of the humanities at the City University of New York and a winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography.